Abstract
Introduction
While a significant amount of research has been directed to develop formal techniques to analyze abstract specifications of cryptographic protocols, few attempts have been made to apply the results developed in that setting to the analysis of cryptoprotocol implementations. Even if specifications exist for these implementations, and even if these had been analyzed formally, there is usually no guarantee that the implementation actually conforms to the specification. An example for a protocol whose design had been formally verified for security and whose implementation was later found to contain a weakness with respect to its use of cryptographic algorithms can be found in [RS98] . Even in software projects where specification techniques are used, often changes in the code that become necessary during the implementation phase because of dynamically changing requirements are not reflected in the specifications. In this paper, we therefore propose an approach to determine security goals provided by a protocol implementation on the source-code level.
Our approach uses automated theorem provers (ATPs) for first-order logic. These are not only automatic, but also quite efficient and powerful, because of the efficient proof procedures implemented in these tools and because security requirements can be formalized straightforwardly in first-order logic (FOL). The C code gives rise to a control flow graph in which the cryptographic operations are represented as abstract functions. The control flow graph is translated to formulas in first-order logic with equality. Together with a logical formalization of the security requirements, they are then given as input into any ATP (such as e-SETHEO [SW00] ) supporting the TPTP input notation, which is a standard input notation for automated theorem provers (ATPs). If the analysis reveals that there could be an attack against the protocol, an attack generation script written in Prolog is generated from the C code. A tool for our approach is available over a web-interface and as open-source [sec] .
The contribution of the current paper consists in applying our approach to an industrially-strength biometric authentication protocol. This work is motivated by an application of our verification tools in an industrial research and development project. In that project, we gathered some valuable experiences 1 with the secure design of biometric authentication protocols and possible pitfalls involved, as well as experiences with applying our verification tools to industrial systems. Since we would like to share these experiences without compromising our confidentiality agreements, we decided to define our own biometric authentication protocol, based solely on openly accessible information such as [VB03] , and demonstrate which kind of problems may arise, and how one can detect them on the implementation level using our tools. We would like to stress that any resemblances between the protocol presented here and actually existing protocols in industrial use are purely coincidental, and that we make no implication that there may have been any security concern with respect to any present or past system of any of our present or past industrial partners, of the kind presented here or any other kind.
Note that this work is not just a matter of using well-understood concepts and existing components, and of applying these to a particular problem: Although there is a lot of work on verifying abstract specifications of cryptographic protocol using formal methods, the verification of implementations of cryptographic protocols using first-order logic is a new research topic. Because of the security problems which may be created at the transition from an abstract specification to an implementation, as mentioned above, one cannot naively apply the specification-based verification techniques to the source-code level. Also, in the case of biometric authentication protocols, problems may arise which are not present in usual authentication protocols.
It is not our goal to provide an automated full formal verification of C code. Instead, our goal is to increase understanding of the security properties of cryptoprotocol implementations in a way as automated as possible to facilitate use in an industrial environment. Because of the abstractions used, the approach may produce false alarms (which however have not surfaced yet in practical examples). Also, for space restrictions we cannot consider features such as pointer arithmetic in our presentation here (we essentially follow the approach in [CKY03] there). We do not consider casts, and expressions are assumed to be well-typed. Loops are only investigated through a bounded number of rounds (which is a classical approach in automated software verification). Also, our focus here is on high-level security properties such as secrecy and authenticity, and not on detecting low-level security flaws such as bufferoverflow attacks.
Code Analysis
The analysis approach presented here works with the well-known Dolev-Yao adversary model for security analysis [DY83, Mea91, Gol03] . The adversary can read messages sent over the network and collect them in his knowledge set, merge and extract messages in the knowledge set, and delete or insert messages on the communication links. The security requirements can then be formalized relative to this adversary model. For example, a data value remains secret from the adversary if it never appears in the knowledge set of the adversary.
We explain the transformation from the control flow graph generated from the C program to first-order logic, which is given as input to the automated theorem prover. The corresponding tool-flow is shown in Fig. 1 . For space restrictions, we restrict our explanation to the analysis for secrecy of data. We use a predicate knows which defines a bound on the knowledge set defined above. Precisely, 
( i n v e r s e k e y ) • conc(E, E ) (concatenation) • head(E) and tail(E) (head and tail of concat.)
Figure 2. Crypto Operations
knows(E) means that the adversary may get to know E during the execution of the protocol. For any data value s supposed to remain confidential, one thus has to check whether one can derive knows(s).
Formally, one considers a term algebra generated from ground data such as variables, keys, nonces and other data using symbolic operations including the ones in Fig. 2 . There, the symbols E, E , and E denote terms inducticely constructed in this way. These symbolic operations are the abstract versions of the cryptographic algorithms used in the code. Generating keys and random values is formalized by introducing new variables representing the keys and random values. For keys and random values that are supposed to be freshly generated for each round of the protocol, one thus has a formula parameterized over these variables, which is then closed by forallquantification. In that term algebra, one defines the equations dec(enc(E, K), inv(K)) = E and ver(sign(E, inv(K)), K, E) = true for all terms E, K, and the usual laws regarding concatenation, head(), and tail().
The set of predicates defined to hold for a given program is defined as follows. For each publicly known expression E, the statement knows(E) is derived. To model the fact that the adversary may enlarge his set of knowledge by constructing new expressions from the ones he knows, including the use of cryptographic operations, formulas are generated for these operations for which some examples are given in Fig. 3 . We use the TPTP notation for the firstorder logic formulas [SS01] , which is the input notation for many automated theorem provers including the one we use, e-SETHEO [SW00] . Here & means logical conjunction and ![E1, E2] forall-quantification over E1, E2.
We now define how a control flow graph generated from a C program (for example, using the aiCall tool [Abs04] ) gives rise to a logical formula characterizing the interaction between the adversary and the protocol participants.
Step 1 We observe that the graph can be transformed to consist of transitions of the form trans(state, inpattern, condition, action, truestate), where inpattern is empty and condition equals true where they are not needed, and where action is a logical expression of the form localvar = value respectively outpattern in case of a local assignment resp. output command (leaving it empty if not needed). There may also be another transition with the negation of the given condition.
Step 2 Now assume that the source code gives rise to a transition TR1 = trans(s1, i1, c1, a1, t1) such that there is a second transition TR2 = trans(s2, i2, c2, a2, t2) where s2 = t1.
If there is no such transition TR2, we define TR2 = trans(t1, [], true, [], t1) to simplify our presentation, where [] is the empty input or output pattern and trueis the boolean condition. Suppose that c1 is of the form cond(arg 1 , . . . , arg n ).
For i1, we definē i1 = knows(i1) in case i1 is non-empty and otherwiseī1 = true. For a1, we defineā1 = a1 in case a1 is of the form localvar = value and a1 = knows(outpattern) in case a1 = outpattern (andā1 = true in case a1 is empty). Then for TR1 we define the following predicate:
The formula formalizes the fact that, if the adversary knows an expression he can assign to the variable i1 such that the condition c1 holds, then this implies thatā1 will hold according to the protocol, which means that either the equation localvar = value holds in case of an assignment, or the adversary gets to know outpattern, in case it is sent out in a1. Also then the predicate for the succeeding transition TR2 will hold.
To construct the recursive definition above, we assume that the control flow graph is finite and cycle-free. Since in general there may be unbounded loops in the C program (although in the case of cryptographic protocols, these are not so prevalent because the emphasis is 
Figure 3. Some general crypto axioms
on interaction rather than computation), this is achieved in an approximate way by fixing a natural number n (supplied by the user of the approach) and unfolding all cycles up to the transition path length n. The resulting logical formula is closed by forall-quantification over all free variables contained.
Step 3 The formulas defined above are written into the TPTP file as axioms. This means that the theorem prover will take these formulas as given. The security requirement to be checked is written into the TPTP file as a conjecture. For example, this could be knows(secret) in case the secrecy of the value secret is to be checked. For authenticity properties, one needs to insert additional correspondence assertions in the formulas defined above at places which are bound by the generation and verification of an authentication certificate. The theorem prover will then check whether the conjecture is derivable from the axioms. In the case of secrecy, the result is interpreted as follows: If knows(secret) can be derived from the axioms, this means that the adversary may potentially get to know secret. If the theorem prover returns that it is not possible to derive knows(secret) from the axioms, this means that the adversary will not get secret.
Note that the adversary knowledge set is approximated from above (because one abstracts away for example from the message sender and receiver identities). This means that one will find all possible attacks, but one may also encounter "false alarms". However, this has not so far happened with practical examples, and the treatment turns out to be rather efficient. Note also that due to the undecidability of first-order logic, one may not always be able to establish automatically that the adversary does not get to know a certain data value, but the theorem prover may execute without termination or may break up because resources are exceeded. In our practical applications of our method, this limitation has, however, not yet become observable.
Step 4 In case the result is that there may be an attack, in order to fix the flaw in the code, it would be helpful to retrieve the attack trace. Since theorem provers such as e-SETHEO are highly optimized for performance by using abstract derivations, it is not trivial to extract this information. Therefore, we also implemented a tool which transforms the logical formulas explained above to Prolog. The translation from the logical formulas to Protolog is quite direct, so that no discrepancies can be expected. While the analysis in Prolog is not useful to establish whether there is an attack in the first place (because it is in order of magnitudes slower than using e-SETHEO and in general there are termination problems with its depth-first search algorithm), Prolog works fine in the case where one already knows that there is an attack, and it only needs to be shown explicitly (because it explicitly assigned values to variables during its search, which can then be queried).
Case-Study
In this section, we would like to report on experiences gained when applying our verification tools in an industrial research and development project. Our goal is to demonstrate that our method is applicable to industrial-size systems. Additionally, we would like to point out some pitfalls one could face when designing biometric authentication systems. As explained in the introduction, for confidentiality reasons we choose not to present the actual system developed in the project, but a protocol we defined ourselves on the basis of openly available information such as [VB03] .
Following [VB03] , the goal is the correct development of a security-critical biometric au-thentication system which is supposed to control access to a protected resource, for example by opening a door or letting someone log into a computer system. In the system proposed in [VB03] , a user carries his biometric reference data on a personal smart-card. To gain access, he inserts the smart-card in the card reader and delivers a fresh biometric sample at the biometric sensor, for example a fingerprint reader. Since the communication links between the host system (containing the biosensor), the card reader, and the smart-card are physically vulnerable, the system needs to make use of a cryptographic protocol to protect this communication. Because the correct design of such protocols and the correct use within the surrounding system is very difficult, we used our method to support the development of the biometric authentication system.
To generate a FOL formula to be analyzed, one needs to consider the level of security provided by the physical layer of the system, and formulate security goals on the execution of the system and on the protection of particular data values. Then the security of the protocol is analyzed using the automated tool support described in the previous section. This is done with respect to the threat model which is derived from the information about the physical security of the system and the security goals, as explained in the previous section.
Inspired by [VB03] , our authentication protocol, is based on a variant of the SSL authentication protocol. A high-level specification of the control flow in the biometric authentication system is given in Fig. 4 . The system components are the smart-card, the host system and the biosensor. The smart-card is personalized for each user. To prevent an attack where an attacker simply repeatedly tries to match a forged biometric sample, for example, using an artificial finger, with a forged or stolen smartcard, the protocol contains a misuse counter which is decreased from an initial value of 3 to 0, when the card will be disabled. The data stored on the card includes the card identifier, the misuse counter, the biometric reference data, a corresponding signature and a key shared with the host system. The host system determines whether the identity of the user can be verified given the biometric reference data on the card and he should thus be granted access. To adapt the handshake part of the SSL authentication protocol to the present setting, we firstly need to account for the fact that communication with a smart-card generally happens in the way that the host system sends a message to the smart-card which is answered by a message back from the smartcard. Thus in the first messages, based on the SSL ClientHello, the card is reset and asked for its ID which the host stores in a variable. Then, following the SSL protocol, the host and smart-card exchange the random numbers ClientHello.random and ServerHello.random and their certificates with which they perform a bidirectional authentication. The biometric authentication is then started with the exchange of the next messages. First, the session key is generated at the smart-card and sent to the host. The confidentiality and integrity of the communication is protected using encryption and MAC using a shared key. Next, the current value of the misuse counter is retrieved from the smart-card. If it is larger than 0, it is decremented at the host and the decremented value is sent back to the smart-card. The smart-card is then queried again for the new value of its misuse counter to see whether it actually stored the decremented value. The integrity of the last messages starting with the retrieval of the misuse counter from the card (including the message names) is protected using MACs using the session key. Then, the biometric ref-erence data is retrieved from the smart-card which is signed with the private administrator key that was created when personalizing the smart-card. After that, the current data is requested from the biosensor and compared with the reference data. The user has up to three attempts to present a biometric sample which is accepted as valid (defined as the degree of coincidence between sample and reference being above the given threshold). If the biometric match is successful, the misuse counter is sent to the default value and the session closed.
For space restrictions, we can only show the main call graph node of the code abstraction from the smart-card side of the protocol in Fig. 5 and one of the message exchanges in Fig. 6 .
Security Analysis
The threat scenario which we consider here is that the adversary somehow obtains possession of a legitimate smart-card and can manipulate the communication link between the smart-card reader and the host system, since it is not assumed to be physically secure.
We have to assume that the adversary can use different (sequential or parallel) executions of the protocol in his attack (with the same or different smart-cards or hosts). This can be achieved by parameterizing the FOL formula generated from the protcol description using a session parameter, using variables for the smart-card, biosensor, and host names, and closing the open formula obtained with a for-all quantification over these parameters.
We have to verify that the protocol provides the intended security guarantees, in particular, that the misuse counter indeed registers any failed attempt to present a false biometric sample to the biosensor. Here we focus on this security requirement, which turned out to be particularly interesting in the case of the given protocol.
We note that each possible instantiation of the message argument variables in the formula corresponds to one execution of the protocol, assuming that each protocol participant accepts only one copy of a given protocol message per protocol execution (and ignores a second message with the same message name).
Note that an automated theorem prover such as SPASS or E-SETHEO considers every possible model satisfying the given axioms to see whether it satisfies the given conjecture, not only the quotients of the free algebra under the formula (as Prolog does). This means that in the models considered, additional properties not following from the given axioms may hold. In the case of cryptographic protocols, this may mean that a secret key coincides with a public value and therefore becomes known to the adversary. This is of course something which one would assume an implementation of the protocol to avoid, and therefore one would like to analyze the protocol under the assumption that this does not happen. Therefore, we formulate the conjecture in a negated way so that a proof of the conjecture corresponds to an attack, and the absence of a proof (equivalently, by soundness and completeness of FOL, a counter-example to the formula) corresponds to the security of the protocol. This makes sure that, when considering a given protocol execution (i.e., a given instantiation of the message variables), all models of the formulas have to fulfill the attack conjecture in order for an attack to be detected, in particular also any model of the formula which does not satisfy any equalities that would be assumed not to hold in an implementation of the protocol (for example, between a secret key and a public value). That way, false positives arising in this way can be avoided.
We would like to ensure that in each execution of the protocol in which the biometric match is performed, the misuse counter is decremented.
The security conjecture is formulated by inserting the predicate match performed in the protocol where the biometric match is performed and predicate fbz2written where the decremented misuse counter has been written to the smart-card. To formulate the security conjecture (wherer epresents logical negation), we assume that in the protocol session between the card and the host which is uniquely determined by the value of the session counters and the messages exchanged in that session (which are given as arguments to the predicates but left out here for readability), the misuse counter is not decremented, but the biometric match is still performed:~f
bz2written&& match_performed
If this conjecture is found to be provable from the axioms, that means that in any possible run of the protocol, the adversary can make the host system perform the biometric match without decrementing the misuse counter. This would break the security function of the misuse counter.
When applying this analysis to our implementation, this turned out to be in fact true. This means, in all models satisfying the set af axioms generated from the protocol description (or equivalently, in the quotient model which satisies only those formulas which follow from the axioms and which is therefore not "degenerated"), there exists a protocol execution in which the adversary sends certain messages to the protocol participants, so that the biometric match is performed, although the misuse counter is not decremented. Thus, the misuse counter does not fulfill its purpose and the protocol implementation has to be seen as insecure (since an adversary can run arbitrary many tests with fake biometric samples until she succeeds in getting access with the stolen card). The result was obtained with SPASS within less than a minute computing time on One should note that thus finding does not constitute a flaw in the scheme proposed in [VB03] , since we extended that scheme in ways based on previous experiences.
After receiving this result from the ATP, we ran the attack generator implemented in Prolog to actually exhibit the attack (by determining the valuations of the message variables, possibly of different protocol sessions). We now explain the result. It turns out that in our implementation, the authentication phase of the protocol is not sufficiently bound to the part where firstly the session key is exchanged and then the misuse counter decremented and the biometric match performed.
The attack proceeds as follows: First, the attacker runs one execution of the protocol using the stolen smart-card and breaks up before the biometric match is performed, e.g. by pulling the smart-card out of the card-reader. Note that at this point, the misuse counter is decremented, since the biometric authentication has not been successfully completed. The first misuse counter is unchanged, since the smart-card is legimate and was therefore successfully authenticated at the host.
One should note that when the smart-card is pulled out (and thus the power cut off), the smart-card returns to its initial state (except that the misuse counter is saved) and is again ready to start another execution of the protocol. Thus, the attacker can now start another execution of the protocol with the same card. When the authentication phase is finished, the attacker now manipulates the communication between the host system and the smart card reader so that the smart-card is cut off from the further communication, and she directly communicates with the host system. This way, she aims to make sure that she can now perform tests in order to get to a positive match of the biosensor using fake biometric samples. For that, she now has to perform the interaction with the host system in the messages responsible to the secure update of the misuse counter herself in order to convince the host system that it still communicates with the legitimate card and that the card in fact decrements its misuse counter. However, this can now be done by replaying the messages from the previous protocol execution. This is due to the fact that in the protocol, the host requests the session key from the smart-card. Although the session key returned by the smart-card is supposed to be protected with a MAC using the private key shared between the host system and the card, and although it is correctly checked by the host that this is actually the case, replay of the session key from the previous session is not prevented. And although the host performs the decrementation of the session key itself, and later checks correctly that the smart-card actually stored the decremented key, the host has to request the current state of the misuse counter from the smart-card to start with. At that point, the attacker can again replay the corresponding message from the smart-card in the previous protocol run, which again sends the default value of the misuse counter to the host. As in the previous run, this value is decremented and sent to the smart-card to be stored. The smartcard is then queried whether it actually stored this decremented value. Again, this check is protected by a MAC which is actually correctly verified, but again the exact message from the smart-card in the previous protocol run can be reused. Then, the biometric reference data is requested from the smart-card, and again the response from the previous run is reused here. That way, the attacker proceeds to the point where the biometric match is performed, although the misuse counter was not again decremented on the card.
The second part of the attack can be iterated arbitrarily many times without decrementation of the misuse counter. That way, the biometric match can eventually be tricked with an inacceptable probability of success.
Note that we do not assume that the attacker somehow obtains the session key from a previous protocol run. In fact, after the successful attack against the protocol, the attacker still does not know the session key. Thus, this attack is different from previous session key replay attacks and specific to the way the misuse counter mechanism is implemented which is necessary in biometric authentication protocol, due to the inherent failure rates in biometric matching.
When examining the specifications, it turned out that the security flaw found in our implementation was made possible since the specification were not sufficiently detailed with When the specification was specialized to prescribe that the random numbers exchanged in the authentication phase are used in the generation of the MACs, and our implementation changed accordingly, the attack described above was not any more possible. We could in fact show that the protocol is secure in the sense of the security conjecture formulated above. Again, this result was obtained with SPASS within less than a minute computing time on an AMD Athlon processor with 1533 MHz. clock frequency and 1024 MB RAM.
Lessons Learned
We discuss some of the experiences gained during the application of our approach presented in this paper.
One of the lessons learned was that the amount of work one has to invest in order to apply our method is dependent on how the code was constructed. Our method needs the least amount when it is applied by the software developers in the course of programming the code. It is more effort to apply our approach to legacy systems, since performing the abstractions that are necessary requires some understanding of the software.
With respect to the preciseness of our analysis, we already mentioned that our method does not suffer from false negatives in the sense that it finds all attacks which exist relative to our adversary model, provided that the annotations introduced by the user are correct. The method does admit the existence of false positives in the sense that attack possibilities found may not have a counter-part in reality, because of the abstrations introduced for efficiency. False positives would have to be expected for example in a situation where an adversary can construct a secret out of two pieces of data which he can gain in two mutually exclusive conditional branches in the protocol, which in the most abstract application of our approach would both be taken into account. However, during several application case-studies so far, including the one presented here, this problem has not become apparent. Also, the fact that a false positive does not constitute a realistic attack becomes apparent by using the Prolog attack generator. [CDW04] reports on the usage of the modelchecker MOPS on security-critical Unix-based applications with respect to low-level security properties such as the proper dropping of privileges, the avoidance of race conditions when accessing files, and the secure creation of temporary files. The approach is applied to applications with over one million lines of code where more than a dozen new security weaknesses in widely-deployed applications were found. Compared to our work, that approach is focussed on low-level implementation details, while we aim to analyze specifically the secure usage of cryptographic operations in implementations.
Related Work
[DDMP03] presents a tool which automates the detection of high-risk security-critical functions based on the observation validated in an experiment in the paper that functions near a source of input are most likely to contain a security vulnerability. The tool is applied to three open source applications with known vulnerabilities and the privilege separation code in the OpenSSH server daemon. Compared to this approach, our approach is directed more specifically to attacks against certain security requirements such as secrecy of data, against which the code is analyzed in depth.
[DM03] uses a tool which repositions stack allocated arrays at compile time by preserving the semantics of the program with a small performance penalty. The paper considers the semantics-preserving transformation of stack allocated arrays to heap allocated "pointers to arrays". Compared to that work, ours is not concerned with the buffer-overflow type of errors, but with security flaws arising from design errors in the security protocol logic.
There are other approaches to using FOL automated theorem provers for cryptoprotocol analysis, so far applied mainly on the specification level. [Sch97] formalizes the wellknown BAN logic in first-order logic and uses the atp SETHEO to proof statements in the BAN logic. It is different from our approach which is based on the knowledge of the adversary, instead of the beliefs of the protocol participants. [Wei99] analyzes the NeumanStubblebine key exchange protocol using firstorder monadic Horn formulas and the atp Spass. This approach differs from ours for ex-
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Proceedings of the 21st Annual Computer Security Applications Conference (ACSAC 2005) 1063-9527/05 $20.00 © 2005 IEEE ample in that in general we also admit nonmonadic Horn formulas (and even non-Horn formulas), to be able to consider unbounded state when necessary to express a security property. [Coh03] uses first-order invariants to verify cryptographic protocols against safety properties. The approach is supported by the atp TAPS. Compared to our approach, the method does not generate counter-examples (that is, attacks) in case a protocol is found to be insecure.
Conclusion
We presented an approach using automated theorem provers for first order logic to understand the security requirements provided by C code implementations of cryptographic protocols. Our approach constructs a logical abstraction of the code which can be used to analyze the code for security properties (such as confidentiality) with automated theorem provers. One should note that it is not our goal to provide an automated full formal verification of C code using formal logic but to increase understanding of cryptoprotocol implementations in an approach which is as automated as possible. Note also that our focus here is on high-level security properties such as secrecy and authenticity, and not on detecting low-level security flaws such as buffer overflows. We demonstrated our approach at the hand of an industrial-strength biometric authentication protocol based on experiences from an industrial research and development project. In all, although our approach is not completely automatic, it turned out to be applicable with reasonable effort in industrial practice.
